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BARNETTE AND MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP: SOME
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Abner S. Greene*
Justice Jackson’s opinion for the Court in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette1 is deservedly famous. Yet, aspects of it raise more
questions than they answer. Barnette is rightly seen as the foundation of the
Supreme Court’s compelled speech doctrine. But key parts of that doctrine
remain under analyzed by the Court. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission2 offered the Court an opportunity to clarify some of
these issues. For religious reasons, Jack Phillips refused to provide a custommade cake for the wedding celebration of a gay couple, Charlie Craig and
David Mullins. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission determined that this
violated state public accommodations anti-discrimination law, and the state
court of appeals affirmed. After the state supreme court declined to hear the
case, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari; much of the briefing and
oral argument was about whether requiring Phillips to make the cake would
amount to unconstitutional compelled expression.3 But the Court resolved the
matter on narrower, as-applied, Free Exercise Clause grounds.4 The
underlying type of conflict in Cakeshop—between a statutorily protected
class of persons and providers of services who claim a set of First
Amendment objections to providing such services—is not going away any
time soon, however,5 and thus it is fruitful to explore the issues from the
Barnette line of cases, as refracted through cases such as Cakeshop.

*
Leonard F. Manning Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. Thanks to the FIU Law conference
organizers for a terrific event.
1

319 U.S. 624 (1943).

2

138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).

The more intuitively obvious claim—that applying the law to Phillips would violate his freedom
of religion—would have failed under Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which holds that courts
should apply only rational basis scrutiny to laws of general applicability that are claimed to violate the
Free Exercise Clause.
3

4 The Court held that “[t]he Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of [Phillips’] case has some
elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated
[Phillips’] objection.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
5 See, e.g., Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017) (holding that there
was no constitutional violation to apply state public accommodations anti-discrimination law to a florist’s
refusal to provide flowers for a same-sex wedding); certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case
remanded for further consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719. See Arlene’s
Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
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Here are three compelled speech issues either directly implicated in
Barnette or that flow from the doctrine Barnette spawned, all issues present
in the Cakeshop litigation: (1) What is the proper level of judicial scrutiny
when state action is claimed to compel expression unconstitutionally? In the
compelled speech area, should the level of scrutiny differ between a law
challenged as facially unconstitutional and an argument that an exemption is
constitutionally required? What is the relationship, in First Amendment law
generally, between as-applied challenges and claims for constitutionally
compelled exemptions? (2) What counts as expression for compelled speech
doctrine purposes? What is the relevance of whether a reasonable observer
would understand the compelled speaker to be advancing her own views as
opposed to merely obeying the law? When is compelled speech properly seen
as endorsement, and what is the relevance for the doctrine of whether or not
compelled speech is properly seen as endorsement? (3) In the more specific
setting of providing goods and services, and the intersection between public
accommodations anti-discrimination law and compelled speech claims, what
is the relevant difference, if any, between denying a good or service without
a specific requested message (say, “no cake for your same-sex wedding
celebration!”) and denying a good or service with a specific requested
message (say, “no cake for you if you insist that it say ‘God Loves Same-Sex
Marriages’”)? What counts as even-handed versus improperly discriminatory
administrative or adjudicative determinations in this setting?
(1) In the first iteration of compelled flag salute/pledge of allegiance
litigation, Minersville School District v. Gobitis,6 treated the matter almost
entirely as a Free Exercise Clause case. Plaintiffs were Jehovah’s Witnesses
arguing on behalf of their public-school children. The claim was not to
invalidate the public-school teacher-led pledge, but rather that the
Constitution compels an exemption for religious conscience. Three years
after Gobitis answered no, Barnette overruled Gobitis. But the Court did not
hold that the Free Exercise Clause requires an exemption in this kind of case.
Rather, the argumentative terrain shifted to concerns about compelled
speech. The Court held that the First Amendment (without clause
specification) compels an exemption from public-school teacher-led pledge
of allegiance, not that such activity is facially invalid.7 (And thus publicschool teacher-led pledge of allegiance continues throughout the land. How
many school-age children know they have a right not to participate?!)8 Justice

6

310 U.S. 586 (1940).

7

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592–96 (1992), invalidated clergy-led prayer at public school
graduation ceremonies, on the ground that although the state did not legally coerce the children to attend
and pray, nonetheless psychological coercion to attend and pray—or at least be perceived as praying—
was present. Accordingly, such clergy-led prayers are unconstitutional on their face; Lee is not about an
8
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Jackson didn’t discuss levels of scrutiny, but the opinion reads as a strictscrutiny opinion. Once Jackson identified the constitutional harm—to the
freedom to say what one wants to say and not to say what one does not want
to say—he put the state to a tough justificatory test, which it failed. The state
may seek to advance the end of national unity in many ways, said Jackson,
but not by putting words in the mouths of schoolchildren.
In the most famous recent First Amendment exemptions case,
Employment Division v. Smith,9 Justice Scalia concluded something quite
different about the proper level of judicial scrutiny. When faced with a neutral
(i.e., nondiscriminatory) law of general applicability (i.e., not regarding
religion alone), courts should adjudicate claims for religious exemption
according to rational basis scrutiny only. So long as the state has a reasonable
ground for demanding uniform obedience (and for not granting an
accommodation), the state wins and the free exercise claimant loses. Thus,
Oregon’s controlled substances laws could be applied to the Native American
Church’s time-honored practice of ingesting peyote (a hallucinogenic drug)
as part of a religious ritual.
Next, let’s consider United States v. O’Brien.10 A federal statute
prohibited knowingly destroying a military draft card (“certificate”); O’Brien
publicly burned his draft card in an act of political protest; he argued that the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protected his conduct. The Court
rejected two versions of O’Brien’s claim. One was a facial challenge to the
statute: that it was unconstitutional because enacted with the purpose of
abridging free speech. The Court responded that it wouldn’t “strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative
motive.”11 O’Brien also argued that the statute was “unconstitutional as
applied to him”12 because his act of draft card destruction was symbolic
speech protected by the First Amendment. The Court rejected this by
applying the now eponymously famous O’Brien test, which is usually
thought of (at least on its face) as intermediate scrutiny.13 The Court stated

opt-out. One might think similar psychological coercion exists when public school children are asked to
stand and recite the pledge of allegiance—even though formally speaking, after Barnette, they may opt
out. The Court has never explained how, under the logic of Lee, public school teacher-led pledge of
allegiance is constitutional. See Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 451 (1995).
9

494 U.S. 872 (1990).

10

391 U.S. 367 (1968).

11

Id. at 383.

12

Id. at 376.

[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
13
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the short version of the test just before the full version: “when ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”14
I want to discuss two things here. One, what is the difference between
an exemptions claim and an as-applied claim, if any? Two, how does any
such difference intersect with the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny?
Exemptions claims arise in this way: A law on its face is constitutionally
valid, and someone argues that a type of constitutional right is sufficiently
powerful to trump whatever state interest there is in 100% uniform
application. In this way, we can see Smith and O’Brien as making a similar
type of argument—the controlled substances law and the draft card nondestruction law were, facially, not problematic (once we are past O’Brien’s
argument that improper legislative motive infected the draft card law). We
don’t need to know specific facts to know whether these laws were
constitutional as applied (more on this in a moment when I discuss a typical
type of Free Speech Clause as-applied challenge). Smith argued, rather, that
his free exercise of religion was significantly burdened by the controlled
substances law and that such a burden ought to outweigh any state interest in
uniform application. Similarly, O’Brien argued that his freedom of speech
was significantly burdened by the draft card law and that such a burden ought
to outweigh any state interest in uniform application. At least this is one way
of understanding the two claims. We can see the Barnettes’ claim in the same
light. The law requiring a teacher-led (and student-uttered) pledge of
allegiance in public schools was, generally speaking, a valid exercise of state
power. The Barnettes were not arguing that the pledge must be invalidated in
toto, just that the application to their children significantly burdened their
freedom of speech (of the compelled speech variety) and that such a burden
ought to outweigh any state interest in uniform application. In this way,
although the Court referred to O’Brien’s claim as an as-applied challenge,15
we might do better to see it as a claim for exemption—alongside Smith’s and
the Barnettes’ structurally similar claims.
The standard free speech as-applied challenge is different. Take, for
example, an incitement case. Let’s assume a law that facially comports with
Brandenburg v. Ohio16 and punishes only incitement that is intended to cause
imminent lawless action and is likely to cause such action. And let’s assume
an arrest and prosecution of someone who falls short of one or both prongs
Id. at 377. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (referring to the O’Brien test
as “intermediate First Amendment scrutiny”).
14

O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.

15

Id.

16

395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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of this test—e.g., a charismatic political counter-cultural figure who urges
imminent lawless action in a setting where the state can’t show beyond a
reasonable doubt that such action is likely to occur. This person’s
constitutional defense isn’t that the law is facially invalid, nor that it is
unconstitutionally overbroad (I am assuming a law that is not), but rather that
because of the balance the Court has deemed the First Amendment to strike
between public safety interests and political dissent, the law may not be
constitutionally applied to her. This is one version of a classic as-applied
challenge. Can we also see this as a claim for exemption? Probably not. My
claimant wouldn’t be arguing that the law is generally valid but that she has
a definable constitutional right in not following it—to speak, or to practice
her religion. Rather, she’s arguing that the law, constitutionally understood,
only goes so far, and that speech beyond that limit isn’t properly covered by
the statute, so there’s no need for an exemption, just a claim of “no proper
application.”17 This sounds like a pure statutory interpretation case, though.
So let’s tweak the hypothetical a bit, and now assume that the law is written
broadly enough to cover my hypothetical speaker, i.e., the law punishes
incitement that is intended to cause imminent lawless action even if it is not
likely to cause such action. Here, the speaker’s as-applied challenge is that
the law may not constitutionally be applied to her.18
Exemptions claims and as-applied claims do share the following quality:
both involve weighing, at one stage of the process or another, and as either a
first-order matter (on the substance) or second-order matter (regarding
institutional concerns), the type and level of state interest against the damage
to the claimed constitutional right. This is so despite the Court’s usually not
using the term “weighing” or “balancing” or anything similar. Thus, Barnette
is best seen—and easily seen, given Justice Jackson’s opinion—as pitting a
strong right against compelled speech against a fairly weak state interest in
insisting on uniform adherence to the pledge of allegiance rule. Smith pits a
cardinal constitutional right to freely exercise one’s religion against a secondorder concern in keeping the judiciary out of the perils of case-by-case
determination of which types of state interests can withstand the often
idiosyncratic (to most eyes and ears) claims of religious necessity, and
simultaneously in avoiding what the majority deemed a kind of anarchy that
17 For an argument that exemptions and as-applied claims are basically the same thing, see
Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied Challenges? A Defense
of Religious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (2018) (“[R]eligious exemption requests are just a
version of what is generally thought of as one of the most common, modest, and preferred modes of
constitutional adjudication: the as-applied challenge.”).
18 This law may also be unconstitutionally overbroad, but (a) to be unconstitutionally overbroad,
it would have to be substantially so, see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615–16 (1973), and (b)
the best understanding is that only a person to whom the law may be constitutionally applied has standing
to raise an overbreadth claim. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1985).
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would result if every man could be a law entire unto himself. O’Brien can be
understood as deeming the government’s interest in an orderly draft card
system as outweighing a dissenter’s desire to express his opposition to the
war through an illegal action (rather than seeing it as his right to political
protest more generally). And in my hypothetical incitement cases, after a long
20th century struggle to understand and refine the right to advocate illegal
action, in a political or ideological setting, the Court finally determined that
the state interest in preventing intentional and likely imminent lawless action
is high enough to outweigh the political speech right, but not otherwise.
The level of scrutiny involved in all of these cases turns primarily on
whether the state interest appears on the face of the law to be about expression
(or religion), versus whether it appears to be about a non-rights-implicating
matter of public health, safety, and the like. Why Smith insists on a rational
basis test only, whereas O’Brien is a kind of intermediate scrutiny, is a
question I put aside; in any event, O’Brien scrutiny, although formally
intermediate, is generally understood as highly deferential to the government.
Both cases involve facially neutral laws of general applicability, where there
is less presumptive reason to think the state is up to some nefarious purpose
involving restriction of religion or speech.19 The law in Barnette was
generally applicable in one sense of the term—it didn’t single out anyone’s
religion or speech—but, critically, the law and practice were all about
expression, not about conduct more generally that might happen to be
expressive. And any law regulating advocacy of unlawful action would also
be directly about expression. In both of these latter settings, there is good
reason for some kind of elevated judicial scrutiny20—either the strict scrutiny
I claim the Court employed in Barnette, or the kind of categorical balancing
present in Brandenburg and in a classic set of cases in which the Court
permits regulation based on speech content but only pursuant to quite
circumscribed tests that are usually strongly rights-favoring.21

19 For arguments about the importance of government purpose in free speech doctrine, see Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767
(2001).
20 This point about the law in Barnette (and in many of the compelled speech cases) being not
generally applicable, in contrast with the laws in cases such as O’Brien and in many religious exemptions
cases (such as Smith), is a key distinction between my analysis and that of Barclay and Rienzi. See Barclay
& Rienzi, supra note 17, at 1599 (“[I]n the particularly relevant comparator context of compelled speech,
courts regularly provide exemptions from generally applicable laws that mirror the exemptions critics fear
in the context of religious exercise.”).
21 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see also Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words). Otherwise, if a law is content-based, the Court applies
a kind of ad hoc strict scrutiny, very difficult for the government to satisfy. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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This leads us back to Cakeshop. The Colorado law is neutral and
generally applicable,22 and the claim is for an exemption. This suggests that
either the Smith or O’Brien approach is appropriate, and thus that rational
basis or (weak) intermediate scrutiny is in order. There is no need for the kind
of fact-intensive inquiry the Court uses in as-applied cases involving statutes
that facially regulate expression.23 And there is no need for the stepped-up
scrutiny of Barnette and its direct progeny—Wooley v. Maynard24 and
National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra,25 which involve
state insistence that individuals or companies use their property to help the
state advance its message; or Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo26 and
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,27 which make
certain speech content triggers to rights of reply that occupy the claimant’s
property and expression space.
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of
Boston,28 however, might give us pause before concluding that the state need
not satisfy stepped-up scrutiny in cases such as Cakeshop. Massachusetts
deemed its public accommodations, anti-discrimination law to apply to the
private organizers of the annual St. Patrick’s Day Parade through the streets
of Boston. The state could have adopted a different approach: once it ceded
a public thoroughfare to a private group for a short period of time, it could
have deemed the space not a place of public accommodation, but rather a
space for private conduct (and expression) not subject to the antidiscrimination rules. But the state deemed otherwise, and thus the organizers
were subject to a mandate that they not discriminate on the basis of, inter alia,
sexual orientation. The organizers didn’t want a group known as GLIB
marching with a banner proclaiming “Irish American Gay, Lesbian and

22 It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse,
withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex,
sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public
accommodation.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017).
23 I put aside the fact-intensive inquiry the Masterpiece Cakeshop Court in fact engaged in,
regarding the relevant state actors’ hostility toward the baker’s religious beliefs.
24

430 U.S. 705 (1977).

138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). I refer to the Court’s invalidation of the “licensed notice” provision of
California law, requiring (in this case) anti-abortion family planning centers to help the state advertise
availability of abortion providers. The Court’s invalidation of the “unlicensed notice” provision of
California law is much harder to defend. For commentary on Becerra, see Abner S. Greene, “Not in My
Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1475, 1495–98 (2018).
25

26

418 U.S. 241 (1974).

27

475 U.S. 1 (1986) (plurality opinion).

28

515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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Bisexual Group of Boston.”29 Relevant state actors held that exclusion a
violation of the anti-discrimination law, and determined that GLIB was
entitled to participate in the parade with its banner. The organizers argued, at
the state level and to the U.S. Supreme Court, that this violated their First
Amendment right against compelled expression, of the “right not to
host/foster another’s speech” variety.
Under the rubric set forth above, this looks like application of a neutral
law of general applicability, and a claim of constitutionally compelled
exemption. That would put this under the O’Brien heading, as a speech claim
(as opposed to a religion claim, under Smith). Indeed, Hurley said that the
state law is not “unusual in any obvious way, since it does not, on its face,
target speech or discriminate on the basis of content,” the focus instead being
to protect gays and lesbians (inter alia) from being denied “publicly available
goods, privileges, and services.”30 The Court immediately pivoted, though,
to this: that the law “has been applied in a peculiar way.”31 There was no
claim or evidence that the organizers had excluded gay persons from
participation in the parade. “Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission
of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.”32 Thus, the state
court had required the organizers to “alter the expressive content of their
parade.”33 In an extremely interesting sentence, the Court then observed:
Although the state courts spoke of the parade as a place of
public accommodation, once the expressive character of
both the parade and the marching GLIB contingent is
understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts’
application of the statute had the effect of declaring the
sponsors’ speech itself to be the public accommodation.34
But this would mean that any group of persons otherwise protected under the
statute would have a right to “participate in [the organizers’] speech,”35 i.e.,
to coopt it or at least reshape it, if not intentionally, then in effect. And that
would violate “the fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his
own message.”36

29

Id. at 570.

30

Id. at 572.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id. at 572–73.

34

Id. at 573.

35

Id.

36

Id.
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This is the key moment in the decision; everything that follows is further
explanation and refinement of the same. So, first the Court reasoned that this
is not a Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel37 case, in which the state
is requiring dissemination of purely factual and uncontroversial
information.38 The Court next explained that even though the parade
organizers may not have been focused and consistent over time on which
messages they included or excluded from their parade, that doesn’t take away
their right to exclude whatever message they think would result from the
GLIB group marching under its GLIB banner.39 After that, the Court
distinguished three cases—two cable television “must carry” rules cases, and
the case in which state law required a private shopping center to allow various
speakers to engage in speech activity.40 Key facts uniting these three cases
are the low risk of misattribution (of the compelled message to the compelled
host) and the common practice and ease of the host’s posting a disclaimer of
connection to various messages seen on the television channels in question
or observed at the shopping center. This discussion is the high-water mark in
the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence for treatment of misattribution
and disclaimer; I will say more about that in Part II. The upshot in Hurley is
the Court’s determination that viewers generally see parades as a whole and
that disclaimers in a moving parade would be odd.41 Thus, the risk of
misattribution here is real, and disclaimers are not an appropriate
recommended solution.
Hurley does not mention levels of scrutiny. Once the Court determined
that the “peculiar” application of the state law would require the organizers
to alter their parade message, the case was over. There is a moment after that
key analytic work is done when the opinion restates that on its face the law
is perfectly valid but that as “applied to expressive activity in the way it was
done here, its apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the
content of their expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose
to alter it with messages of their own.”42 This is an interesting and perhaps
unusual move—to redefine the state interest from the general one immanent
in the law on its face to the specific, as-applied one. Once we redefine the
state interest as requiring alteration of private speech content, strict scrutiny
would seem appropriate and would (usually) be fatal.43 The opinion then
37

471 U.S. 626 (1985).

38

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573.

39

Id. at 574–75.

40

Id. at 575–80. For further discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 78–79.

41

See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576–77, 580.

42

Id. at 578.

See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226–27 (2015) (holding that strict scrutiny
applies to laws that are facially content-based; the case was about regulation of private speech, though,
43
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makes one more approach at how to see this case: perhaps, it says, we can
see the state’s objective as “forbidding acts of discrimination toward certain
classes . . . to produce a society free of the corresponding biases.”44 That is a
legitimate state end, but there is a problem if the means to such an end is to
alter the organizer’s private message.45
Laws of general applicability will have various types of application.
Usually they will involve no countervailing claim of constitutional right, and
thus a rational basis test is all that is needed to ensure legitimacy. If, however,
the application involves administrative evaluation of speech content, then it
is correct to employ strict scrutiny. So, for example, a disturbing the peace
law is unproblematic facially (from a First Amendment perspective); but if
the officer on the beat makes a content determination before deciding if the
peace has been disturbed, we now need strict scrutiny.46 Otherwise, true
intermediate scrutiny—not the kind that operates more like rational basis
scrutiny (which arguably occurred in O’Brien itself)—can often properly
balance state objectives against private constitutional rights claims. This is
the best way of understanding Hurley. Massachusetts’ ends are laudable;
most times, application of the law will root out constitutionally regulable
discrimination; but sometimes—rarely it seems, as this was a “peculiar”
case—the means to the laudable end will involve demanding that a private
actor alter its expression. Implicit in the unanimous Hurley decision is a
weighing—the right not to host/foster another’s speech gets significant
weight, diminishing the weight the state’s anti-discrimination interest gets in
typical public accommodations cases.
If an iteration of Cakeshop returns to the Court, the Court similarly
should apply O’Brien as true intermediate scrutiny. One among several hard
questions will be whether it is proper to see the relevant business activity as
expressive and thus as expression being altered by the otherwise
unobjectionable anti-discrimination law. Even if the answer is yes (as I
suggest in Part II it should be), there is still the matter of determining the
not about compelled speech). Government should be able to satisfy strict scrutiny when its laws require
alteration of speech content in the public health and safety disclosure/notice setting, if the speech is factual
and not ideologically controversial. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985); see also Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (setting forth
examples of compelled speech in the disclosure/notice setting, where I claim the state action in question
should satisfy strict scrutiny).
44

Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578.

45

See id. at 579.

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (invalidating, on strict scrutiny, a disturbing
the peace/offensive conduct statute as applied to a person wearing a jacket in a courthouse corridor with
the words “Fuck the Draft” visible); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff Dep’t,
533 F.3d 780, 787–90 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying a general statute regulating disruption near schools to an
anti-abortion truck displaying photos of aborted fetuses; because police made a content-based decision
about the photos being disruptive, the court shifted from lower to higher scrutiny).
46
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weight of the state interest in ensuring the provision of goods and services on
a nondiscriminatory basis, which seems quite a bit higher than the state
interest in ensuring access to a privately organized parade (albeit a place of
public accommodation).47
(2) The Cakeshop issue that took up the most briefing space, and the
most oral argument time, was whether Phillips’ custom-made wedding cakes
should count as expression for Free Speech Clause purposes. Phillips argued
that this part of his business involves a kind of artistic creativity or
expression48 and that even though this iteration of artistic creativity is a
product for sale in a for-profit business, the First Amendment should cover
the cake-making. Note that I am talking about “coverage,” not “protection,”49
i.e., just about whether we are even in Free Speech Clause territory, before
we get to questions of levels of scrutiny and state interest. Part of Phillips’
argument for First Amendment coverage was that with his custom-made
wedding cakes he intends to celebrate and should be understood as
celebrating the weddings for which the cakes are made.50 On the other side,
some of the amicus briefs for the state and the gay couple (Craig and Mullins)
argued (inter alia) that custom-made wedding cakes do not count as
expression for First Amendment purposes. The American Unity Fund brief
(by Professors Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh) drew a line between
“writers, photographers, painters, singers, and similar speakers” who might
be hired for a wedding (First Amendment covered expression) and “baking,
clothing design, architecture, and other activities” (not First Amendment
covered expression).51 The Freedom of Speech Scholars Brief (by Professor
Steven Shiffrin) contended that “[m]usic falls within the scope of the First
Amendment; the products of jewelers, florists, chefs, and bakeries do not,
even though they involve skill and artistic judgment.”52 And the Brief of
Professor Tobias B. Wolff claimed that Phillips’ business “is not engaged in

47 It would have made more sense in the Hurley setting for Massachusetts either to have deemed
the parade purely private, not subject to public accommodations law, or to have deemed the parade a type
of state action, seeing the organizers as stepping into the shoes of the city. If this state action model were
followed, then we would see the parade as a type of public forum, and the GLIB group with its banner
would have had a right to participate.
48 Brief for Petitioners at 1, 5, 8, 14–15, 17, 18–25, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
49

For more on this, see Greene, supra note 25, at 1509–11.

50

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 2, 19, 21.

Brief of American Unity Fund and Profs. Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondents at 1, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Brief of American Unity Fund].
51

52 Brief for Freedom of Speech Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
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its own act of personal expression, it is providing a commercial service.”53 In
any event, the gay couple and others contended, the reasonable observer
would not understand the custom-made cake to be an expression of the
baker’s views, but rather of the couple’s views; the baker, on this approach,
is just following the law in baking the cake.54 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent
adopts this position,55 whereas Justice Thomas’ concurrence in part and in
the judgment rejects the relevance to compelled speech analysis of what a
reasonable observer would think about the connection between a custommade wedding cake and the baker’s views about the wedding.56
My views on this are as follows: We should accept Phillips’ claim that
his custom wedding cake baking constitutes expression for First Amendment
coverage; if a reasonable observer would misattribute the cake in this case
(had it been made) to Phillips’ own convictions, that would be a sufficient
ground to deem a prima facie Free Speech Clause violation to have occurred;
but whether we should understand Phillips to be endorsing a same-sex
wedding celebration for which he is baking a custom cake is not a necessary
part of compelled speech analysis for First Amendment purposes. That is
because claims such as Phillips’ are better understood under a broader
rubric—what I call a “not in my name” claim of constitutional right, which
is a claim of expressive association.57 Although such claims may involve
misattribution analysis, they need not. This allows us to see, similarly, that
we have to proceed with caution when analyzing the constitutionally relevant
meaning of a set of private choices in response to a legal prohibition,
requirement, or permission.
The arguments against custom wedding cake baking as expressive are
first-order and second-order. The first-order argument is that such a baker is
just running a business, fulfilling customer demand, producing cakes as if he
were producing any other good.58 But the argument cannot be that he is
producing cakes as if he were producing widgets, because the whole point of
a made-to-order business (or part of a business) is that the goods aren’t
fungible. So the critic has to fall back on the claim that even if the cakes
53 Brief of Professor Tobias B. Wolff as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111).
54 Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 34–35, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); Brief of Professor Tobias B. Wolff,
supra note 53, at 14; see also Craig & Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 286–87
(Colo. Ct. App. 2015); Robert Post, An Analysis of DOJ’s Brief in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE
(Oct. 18, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-analysis-of-doj-s-brief-in-masterpiece-cakeshop.
55 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1748 n.1 (2018)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56

Id. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).

57

See Greene, supra note 25, at 1478–79.

58

See Brief of American Unity Fund, supra note 51, at 9–10.
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aren’t fungible, and are customer-specific, they are still customer designdriven. There would be something to this if the baker were just executing the
customer’s design. Consider a company that will take your iPhone pictures
and make them into a photo album. You select the pictures, determine how
they’re going to appear, and then the company executes the order. If that’s
how Phillips produces his cakes, then his claim for First Amendment covered
expression would be weak. But it isn’t how he produces his custom-made
wedding cakes. Rather, he has discussions with prospective customers, gets
their ideas, and then has discretion regarding many of the details.59 A good
analogy would be to a trompe l’oeil artist, who creates realistic looking
backdrops for (say) people’s homes, with significant input from the
homeowner but also discretion on how to execute the work.60 I would assume
most readers would say this is First Amendment covered artistic expression.
(Again, we are only now talking about coverage—are we in the Free Speech
Clause area of tests, scrutiny, state interest, harm to speaker, etc.?—and not
about the ultimate outcome of the case.) And consider the strip-club dancers
in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.61 The case ended up presenting several difficult
First Amendment questions. Before getting to them, the Court concluded that
this kind of nude dancing for money is “expressive conduct,” though “within
the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection [i.e., coverage].”62 One
might have said the women involved were just doing this for money, as a
business, to satisfy consumer demand. But the Court refrained from saying
that, for good reason—how is one then to distinguish, for example, dancers
who work for a living with the American Ballet Theatre?
That leads us to the critics’ second-order argument. The claim is that if
we open the door to seeing custom wedding cake bakers as engaged in First
Amendment covered expression, then we will have to see all sorts of
businesspersons as similarly covered. Some mention clothing design and
architecture; and what about law firms, who engage in speech activity?
Underlying this argument is the concern that judges can’t consistently
adjudicate such claims and that there would be a floodgate of such claims and
victories for businesspersons against public accommodations antidiscrimination laws and perhaps other legal protections. My response here is
similar to my response in the Free Exercise Clause exemptions setting63—we

59

See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 7–8.

See, e.g., JORDAN MURAL DESIGN, INC., http://www.philipjordan.com/index.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2018).
60
61

529 U.S. 277 (2000).

62

Id. at 289.

See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 149–57 (2012); Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses,
102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993).
63
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should accept the threshold claims of harm to a constitutionally protected
interest and develop a kind of constitutional common law to properly balance
these harms against state interests in uniform enforcement, interests that are
often strong. If there is a good first-order argument for seeing clothing design
and architecture as expressive, then we should appreciate that the state can
interfere with such expression in all sorts of nefarious ways—both in
restricting expression and in compelling it—but vote for the state in situations
in which the state interest is sufficiently strong to outweigh whatever hit there
is to the speech interest. As a first-order matter, it’s hard to deny that clothingdesigners-for-hire and architects-for-hire usually have creative expressive
discretion packaged with whatever marching orders they have from their
paying clients.
If we accept (some) custom wedding-cake baking as expressive—for
threshold Free Speech Clause purposes—then it shouldn’t matter whether we
see this as pure expression or expressive conduct. What should matter for
constitutional analysis is the nature of the state action involved. So, if
someone is burning a draft card as an act of political protest, that is both pure
expression—of a nonlinguistic sort, to be sure, but expression nonetheless—
and also conduct (burning something, expressive or not). If the government
passed a law banning expressive burning of draft cards, that would trigger
strict scrutiny; if it passed a law banning any burning of draft cards, then if
applied to an expressive act, we should apply intermediate scrutiny (putting
aside whether evidence of dissent-squelching purpose behind an otherwise
neutral law of general applicability should elevate the level of judicial
scrutiny). Even with a case involving pure expression with no possible
expressive conduct twist—say, a painter in her studio—our ultimate concern
is with the type of law and its balance with the type of expression. A law
banning a certain type of chemical because of danger to health, as applied to
a certain kind of paint a painter uses, will get much more relaxed scrutiny
than a law banning a certain type of painting. But the First Amendment is in
play in both instances.
Part of Phillips’ argument was that any custom wedding cake he makes
“announces through [his] voice that a marriage has occurred and should be
celebrated.”64 And, regarding the cake that Craig and Mullins requested,
Phillips argued that “any wedding cake he would design for them would
express messages about their union that he could not in good conscience
communicate.”65 His brief added, “A person viewing one of Phillips’s custom
wedding cakes would understand that it celebrates and expresses support for

64

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 2.

65

Id. at 21.
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the couple’s marriage.”66 On the other hand, Phillips recognized that if a
reasonable viewer would understand the cake as compelled by law, such a
viewer would not assume Phillips supports same-sex marriage; indeed, this
is one of the arrows in the quiver of those opposing the compelled speech
claim in this setting.67 Since such an argument would scuttle most of
compelled speech case law, Phillips argued that this cannot be the right way
to understand the free speech right at stake.68 Justice Thomas made the same
point in his opinion supporting Phillips’ compelled speech claim.69
Because a reasonable observer would understand speech compelled by
law as not necessarily expressing anything about the speaker’s actual beliefs,
and because we nonetheless have a robust compelled speech doctrine,
whether misattribution is or is not present in a given case cannot be the crux
of the constitutional analysis. The best way to understand the doctrine is that
misattribution is a sufficient, but not necessary, ground for a prima facie
claim of right.70
Barnette contains no discussion regarding whether one would
appreciate the pledge was compelled.71 Dissenting Justice Rehnquist in
66

Id. at 24.

67

See Post, supra note 54.

68

Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 30–31.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1744 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
69

70 For related discussion of the misattribution problem in the compelled speech case law, see
Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833, 839–44 (2010). Sometimes determining
what beliefs to attribute to a particular person, in compelled speech situations, is difficult. One subset of
this problem is what to make of a legal permission. So, after Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977),
was decided, Laurence Tribe wrote that the Court had created a conundrum for persons such as the
Maynards: before the decision, if they displayed the “Live Free or Die” motto on their license plate (as
opposed to covering it up, which they did and which generated the litigation), they could credibly claim
they were just following the law and one should not assume they believed the motto’s message; but after
the decision, if they now do not cover up the motto, one might assume they believe the motto’s message!
Laurence H. Tribe, Disentangling Symmetries: Speech, Association, Parenthood, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 641,
644 (2001). In his PruneYard concurrence, Justice Powell wrote very nearly the converse: before Wooley,
people such as the Maynards were put to the difficult choice of merely complying with the law or doing
that combined with dissenting by putting up (say) a bumper sticker (putting aside the third option of direct
disobedience by covering up the motto, which the Maynards did), and, said Powell, if they did not put up
the bumper sticker, one might think they agreed with the motto’s message! PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).

The problem with the Tribe and Powell analyses is that they make too much out of inaction (just as
statutory interpreters should not make too much out of legislative inaction). In the face of a legal
permission (rather than a prohibition or a requirement), a choice to not take up the permission could mean
many things. Permitted to cover up the motto but don’t; permitted to put up a dissenting bumper sticker
but don’t—do the failures to act indicate agreement with the motto’s message? They could, but they could
also mean inertia or the desire not to stand out. Or probably other options as well.
71 Although reasonable minds might differ on this point, it seems most likely that a compulsory
public school pledge of allegiance would be understood as such. Accordingly, reasonable viewers and
even the children themselves would appreciate that their mouthing the words of the pledge constitutes no
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Wooley echoed the state supreme court’s point that displaying “Live Free or
Die” on one’s car license plate conveyed no endorsement of that message—
in part because one may dissent in the same forum, as it were, by putting up
a bumper sticker to the contrary.72 But the majority was unmoved by this
argument, and didn’t even address it. Similarly, in the two “right of reply”
cases in which certain speech content would trigger a right to take up space
in another speaker’s property—Tornillo and Pacific Gas—the Court was
mostly unconcerned about the fact that readers of the compelled speech
would know that such speech was compelled. There is no mention of this in
Tornillo;73 in a footnote in Pacific Gas, the Court dismissed the possibility of
a disclaimer curing possible misattribution as sufficient to undo the
constitutional harm to the utility that was compelled by law to carry an
unwanted message.74 But this concern about possible misattribution was not
front and center in the Court’s analysis. Hurley is the one compelled speech
case in which misattribution seemed to play a role in the Court’s striking
down state action. The Court was concerned that “GLIB’s participation
would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council’s customary
determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was
worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”75 And it added:
“Although each parade unit generally identifies itself, each is understood to
contribute something to a common theme.”76 And this:
Without deciding on the precise significance of the
likelihood of misattribution, it nonetheless becomes clear
that in the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest
march, the parade’s overall message is distilled from the
individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s
expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.77
Misattribution was a concern in Hurley, and the risk of such was perhaps a
sufficient ground for the holding, but there’s no reason to believe the case
endorsement. Thus, Justice Jackson engaged in rhetorical overkill when he wrote “the compulsory flag
salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind,” West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943), and when he wrote that a compelled pledge “force[s]
citizens to confess by word or act their faith” in government orthodoxy, id. at 642. Affirmation and
confession are better used for a situation in which the reasonable observer would understand the utterance
to be authentic and/or the state is not only compelling the utterance but also not allowing dissent on the
point in question. When dissent is open and misattribution is absent, the compelled utterance is not
affirming anything or confessing to anything. See Greene, supra note 8, at 473–78.
72

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

73

Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).

74

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 n.11 (1986) (plurality opinion).

75

Hurley v. Irish-Am., Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 575 (1995).

76

Id. at 576.

77

Id. at 577.
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would have come out the other way had the Court been satisfied that viewers
would have understood the GLIB banner was present under court order. The
concern was deeper, or different: that the application of the law interfered
with whatever message(s) the parade organizers wished to present.
Finally, although Hurley is the one compelled speech case in which
misattribution seemed to matter to the Court’s striking down state action, in
a few cases upholding compelled speech, the Court deemed the absence of
likely misattribution significant, as well as the possibility of disclaimer to
avoid misattribution. This was so in the two cable television “must carry”
cases,78 and in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,79 where California
required some private shopping center owners to permit some unwanted
speakers on premises.
We should conclude that misattribution risk is just a factor in an analysis
that is best seen as balancing the nature and level of hit to the constitutional
right against the state interest. Thus, in Barnette we have a significant harm
(a compelled utterance) and a weak state interest (does the state really need
to compel dissenting children to say the pledge to achieve some semblance
of national unity?); in Wooley we have a lesser harm but still something
personal (the cooptation of space on one’s vehicle) and a weak state interest
(does the state really need to compel dissenting auto owners to carry the
motto to advance the message of the motto?). The corporate claimants in the
cable television cases are less personally affected by the must-carry rule, and
the governmental interest in regulating the monopolistic nature of cable
television is pretty strong. Similarly, the business claimant in PruneYard is
less personally affected by the “must-host” rule, and the state interest in
allowing various persons access to a space where people increasingly
congregate (shopping centers, in many communities) is, if not compelling, at
least a type of interest understood within First Amendment public forum
doctrine.
Thus, misattribution is relevant to the harm from compelled speech, and
might even qualify as one subcategory of such harm, but (a) even when
misattribution is present, the state interest might be high enough to outweigh
the claim of constitutional right (it would have to be quite high to outweigh
the harm from misattribution, but we should leave open the possibility that it
could be), and (b) importantly for analyzing cases such as Cakeshop (and
Barnette and Wooley), a harm of constitutional magnitude might exist when
the state compels speech, even absent likely misattribution. That is the case
with Phillips. If we understand his custom wedding cake-making as
expressive, and appreciate that this is so even though it is also business
78 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 655–56 (1994).
79

447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980).
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conduct, then even if we dismiss his argument that he is perceived as
endorsing the weddings for which he bakes cakes, we might still see a harm
of constitutional magnitude in the compulsion (again, before reaching the
question of countervailing state interest and balancing).
But what kind of harm is it? If people such as Phillips are not being
prevented from speaking their minds, and are not being compelled to endorse
messages with which they disagree, we might do better to understand the
harm as something other than a violation of the freedom of speech. The thread
that runs through the compelled speech cases, and the cases about compelled
subsidies for speech, is better understood as sounding in the right of freedom
of expressive association. Assuming a custom-made wedding cake
constitutes expression (and I have argued above that it often does), then the
baker is at least associated with what the cake celebrates. Association is the
weaker cousin of endorsement and attribution. It can exist even when we
know the state has compelled the connection, and thus when no one
reasonably thinks the baker supports the wedding—or that he does not
support it. But the cake aids and abets the celebration of the wedding, and
thus the baker is complicit in the celebration.80 The state has forced his
creative act to be associated with the celebration, which we may see as
occurring (in small part, but in part nonetheless) in his name. All compelled
speech claims may be understood as claims of expressive association (or, a
right of expressive dis-association), and, in the vernacular, as “not in my
name” claims of constitutional right. Thus, even though the harm in
compelled speech cases may sometimes be understood in other ways—the
use of the body in Barnette (via utterance); the use of personal property in
Wooley; the use of business property in Becerra; the cooptation of another’s
speech license in Hurley (and a misattribution concern); certain types of
speech content triggering rights of reply in Tornillo and Pacific Gas—what
unites these cases is a broader, weaker, yet still present harm to the freedom
of expressive association. That is: to the freedom to contribute one’s
expression to messages and ends of one’s choosing; to avoid whatever taint
one may feel exists when that freedom is used toward another’s end (the
state’s or a private party’s), via state action. This is also the common thread
80 There is an interesting connection between the expressive association theory I am discussing
here and understandings of complicity. But when we are thinking about a grounding theory for compelled
speech claims (and compelled subsidies of speech claims), we must limit our complicity understanding to
the expressive setting. For example, someone providing folding chairs for weddings, who doesn’t want to
provide such chairs for a same-sex wedding, might still have a complicity-type argument—and that might
sound in free exercise of religion terms (or would, at least as a prima facie claim, subject to weighing
against state interest, if Smith were overruled)—but would not have an expressive association claim. For
some thoughts about complicity claims in the First Amendment setting, see Greene, supra note 25, at 1483
n.33 (discussing Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions
in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015), and Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, It’s About Money:
The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (2015)).
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uniting the Abood v. Detroit Board of Education81 line of cases involving
compelled subsidies for the speech of another private actor. And it helps
explain why there is a presumptive violation of the right of expressive
association that is overridden when the state compels subsidies for its own
speech (Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association82): the state speaks for
its citizens, and thus state speech is properly in the name of the citizens.83
(3) Consider this: A gay male couple walks into a bakery and asks for a
custom-made wedding cake; there is no discussion of whether the couple
wants any written message on the cake. The baker says no, because although
he will provide various products to gay men and lesbians, his religious
scruples against same-sex marriage prevent him from making the cake this
couple wants. And this: A religious Christian walks into a bakery and asks
for a Bible-shaped cake with biblical verses condemning homosexuality. The
baker says no, because although he will bake a Bible-shaped cake, he doesn’t
want to be party to spreading the anti-gay message. The state deems the first
baker to have discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, but deems the
second baker not to have discriminated on the basis of religion. Does this
differential outcome reflect anti-religious bias on behalf of the state?
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Cakeshop deems the differential
treatment described here part of the evidence revealing anti-religion animus
on the part of the state.84 His grounds for so concluding, however, although
plausible, are not what ultimately interest me here, in part because in a similar
future case, the state could rectify Kennedy’s concerns. Justice Gorsuch
(joined by Justice Alito) and Justice Kagan (joined by Justice Breyer) wrote
concurrences that engaged directly in attempting to answer the question I
posed in the above paragraph. Kagan echoed the argument advanced by Craig
and Mullins, and by Colorado:85 on the facts presented, Phillips rejected not
a specific message, but the very idea of a custom-made cake for a same-sex
wedding celebration. The state could reasonably deem this to be
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, a protected class under state
law. On the facts presented, the bakers in the other case (where William Jack
tried three times to get his anti-gay-marriage message baked into a cake)
rejected those specific messages, and did not engage in discrimination on the
basis of religion (also a protected class under the state law). The state permits
businesses to say no because they don’t want to create a specific message;
81 431 U.S. 209, 232–37 (1977). I refer to the part of Abood that by a 9-0 vote invalidated
compulsory union fees in lieu of dues when supporting ideological union speech not connected to
collective bargaining.
82

544 U.S. 550, 562–67 (2005).

83

For an elaboration of this “not in my name” idea, see Greene, supra note 25.
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Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1730–31 (2018).
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Id. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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that is not a protected class. On this logic, if Craig and Mullins had asked for
a cake saying “God Blesses Same-Sex Marriage,” Phillips could plausibly
have rejected that because he didn’t want to help spread that message, and
not because of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. And if
William Jack had walked into a bakery and asked not for a written message
but for a cake for (say) his child’s religious communion, and had been
rejected because the baker has religious (or secular) scruples against
communion, that would constitute discrimination on the basis of religion.
All of this seems pretty straightforward. Not that proving discriminatory
purpose is easy; sometimes it is, sometimes it isn’t, and different kinds of
evidence make cases easier or harder. But one may plausibly conclude that
Phillips’ cake denial was based on sexual orientation and that the William
Jack bakers’ denials were based on message-dislike and not on religion.
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence doesn’t exactly challenge this. He doesn’t say
those two conclusions are implausible. What he says is that the relevant
Colorado state actors reasoned differently in the two settings, differently in a
way that betrays religious animus. Here is the relevant language from
Gorsuch:
[All of the] bakers knew their conduct promised the effect of
leaving a customer in a protected class unserved. But there’s
no indication the bakers actually intended to refuse service
because of a customer’s protected characteristic. We know
this because all of the bakers explained without contradiction
that they would not sell the requested cakes to anyone, while
they would sell other cakes to members of the protected class
(as well as to anyone else). So, for example, the bakers in the
first case would have refused to sell a cake denigrating samesex marriage to an atheist customer, just as the baker in the
second case would have refused to sell a cake celebrating
same-sex marriage to a heterosexual customer. And the
bakers in the first case were generally happy to sell to
persons of faith, just as the baker in the second case was
generally happy to sell to gay persons. In both cases, it was
the kind of cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered to
the bakers.86
Gorsuch then argues:
In Mr. Jack’s case, the Commission chose to distinguish
carefully between intended and knowingly accepted
effects. . . . Yet, in Mr. Phillips’s case, the Commission

86

Id. at 1735–36 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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dismissed this very same argument as resting on a
“distinction without a difference.” . . . It concluded instead
that an “intent to disfavor” a protected class of persons
should be “readily . . . presumed” from the knowing failure
to serve someone who belongs to that class.87
Justice Kagan’s response challenges Justice Gorsuch’s claim that
Phillips was refusing to sell a cake celebrating same-sex marriage. Rather,
she argues, he was refusing to sell a custom-made wedding cake to a samesex couple that he would have sold to an opposite-sex couple.88 On the other
hand, the William Jack bakers would not have sold the cake with the antisame-sex marriage language to anyone. This is a powerful response, and
perhaps adequate to beat Gorsuch at his game. But perhaps not. Because
underlying Gorsuch’s reasoning is an acceptance of Phillips’ argument that a
custom-made wedding cake for a same-sex marriage expresses celebration of
that marriage with or without specific celebrating words on the cake. To some
extent this smuggles in an answer to a key question in the compelled speech
debate in this case. But let’s take Phillips’ side of the debate on that question
(as I have done above): his custom wedding cake making is always
expressive, and at least is always associated with the wedding celebration,
even if it’s not proper to say the cakes endorse the weddings in question or
that we can attribute support for such weddings to Phillips. We might then
agree with Gorsuch that Colorado has treated the two cases differently in
terms of reasoning from knowledge to intent for Phillips but not for the
William Jack bakers.
But, contrary to Justice Gorsuch’s key next step in his argument, such
differential reasoning does not necessarily reflect religious animus. It all
depends on what we make of a state actor’s taking a kind of judicial notice
of these social facts: gay and lesbian people get same-sex married, straight
people do not. (I’m sure we could find some examples, but they must be small
in number and are not what the same-sex marriage debate is about.) Thus,
denying a cake for a same-sex wedding celebration that one would bake for
an opposite-sex wedding celebration is treating a gay or lesbian couple
differently from how one would treat a straight couple. (Here, I have to
acknowledge that sometimes a gay man marries a woman, and sometimes a
lesbian marries a man, and sometimes a gay man marries a lesbian, but again
usually opposite-sex couples are straight, sexually speaking.) The gap
between knowing the cake is for two gay men and intending to treat the two
gay men differently from how one would treat a straight man and a straight
woman is vanishingly thin. Generally, the state does not have to prove a more
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specific intent to prevail in an anti-discrimination law case (i.e., it does not
have to show that the covered person or business had the intention to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, as a kind of meta-intention).
In the William Jack cases, the bakers are on much more solid ground in
saying they would not sell that message to anyone, religious or not, and even
though they know Jack himself wants the message out of deep religious faith,
there is a clear gap between that knowledge and any plausible conclusion of
religious discriminatory intent.

